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FRAMEWORK FOR THE APPROXIMATION OF NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
ACQUIS: FROM A VAGUE DEFINITION TO 
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION
Uroš Ćemalović*
Summary: In order to achieve the objectives of integration policies, one 
of the crucial activities of the European Community was to ensure the 
approximation of laws of the Member States to the extent necessary 
for the functioning of the common/internal market. In this field, the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has not brought along any significant 
changes. The substantive provisions conferring competence may be 
added, deleted or modified, as part of another common policy that 
contributes to the functioning of the internal market, without requir-
ing changes in the procedural rules of the law approximation policy 
itself. Moreover, primary law includes several provisions on law ap-
proximation, without giving sufficient indication of any comprehensive 
definition of this concept, providing only a general and vague norma-
tive framework. For this reason, it was the judicial interpretation of 
the rules of cross-community policy of the approximation of legislation 
that came to complete the provisions of the treaties in a creative and 
evolutionary manner. In order to explain and analyse this evolution, 
this paper will first focus on the nature of the provisions on law ap-
proximation set by the treaties and then examine how those provi-
sions were interpreted and completed by the Court of Justice.
1 Introduction
From the very beginning of international relations understood as 
inter-state relations, there has been a need to put into concordance or, 
at least, to ensure the peaceful coexistence1 of various provisions of dif-
*  Expert in EU law and intellectual property law, Doctor of the University of Strasbourg, 
Professor at the Faculty of Law, Public Administration and Security, John Naisbitt Univer-
sity, Belgrade, Serbia.
1 Some authors expressly underline the need to coordinate national legal systems: Henry 
Schermers and Denis Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (6th edn, Kluwer 
Law International 2001); Joël Rideau, Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés 
européennes (5ème édn, LGDJ 2006); Maksymilian del Mar and Zenon Bankowski, Law as 
Institutional Normative Order (Edinburgh Centre for Law and Society 2009). On the other 
hand, certain authors give preference to the use of terms ‘harmonisation’ or ‘approxima-
tion’: Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy (Dart-
mouth Publishing 1990); Mark Van Hoecke and François Ost, The Harmonisation of the Eu-
ropean Private Law (Hart Publishing 2000); Jean Carbonier, Droit civil – Introduction (27ème 
édn, Presses universitaires de France 2000); Yvon Loussouarn, Pierre Bourel and Pascal de 
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ferent legal orders. The process of European integration has additionally 
accentuated this necessity. Moreover, the difficulties in distinguishing 
between the notions of ‘approximation’ and ‘harmonisation’ of national 
legal systems, besides the fact that they gave rise to important theoretical 
problems, can also make it very complex to define the crucial intentions 
of the European legislature in this field. Of course, the definition of these 
two notions undeniably applies for an analysis of harmonisation as a 
necessary precondition for unification as the highest degree of concord-
ance, but it has no operational value for an analysis of the provisions of 
treaties that led to the creation of the European Union.2 Even though the 
objective of this paper is not to perform an historical analysis of primary 
law, in the first part we will focus both on the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (TEC)3 and on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.4 
The reason for this choice is clear: the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (previously the Court of Justice of the European Communities – 
CJEC) interpreted the general principles of harmonisation/approxima-
tion mostly on the basis of the TEC, while the Lisbon Treaty (Title VII, 
chapter 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) has brought some 
changes which, in spite of their limited scope, can be the starting point 
for an evolutionary interpretation.5 
Reference to the notion of ‘harmonisation’, in most cases accompa-
nied by the specification ‘of laws and regulations of the Member States’,6 
has appeared in fourteen articles of the TEC, of which ten concerned the 
Vareilles-Sommieres, Droit international privé (8ème édn, Dalloz précis 2004); Carine Doutrel-
epont and Lucette Defalque, Théorie générale du rapprochement des legislations - partie I 
(ULB 2006).
2 For the topic under examination, it is important to find out how the principles of law 
approximation policy evolved from their definition in the Treaties to being interpreted and 
completed by the Court of Justice. For this reason, the term ‘European Community’ will be 
used when we analyse the legal grounds (and their interpretation) adopted before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
3 Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ 
C325/33.
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union [2008] OJ C83/13.
5 See section 3 and n 69.
6 This, for example, was the case of the following articles of the TEC: 13 (belonging to the 
first part of the TEC dedicated to the general principles), 129 (Title VIII – Employment), 
137 (Title XI – Social policy, education, vocational training and youth, Chapter 1 on social 
provisions), 149 and 150 (Title XI – Social policy, education, vocational training and youth, 
Chapter 3 on education, vocational training and youth), 151 (Title XII – Culture), 152 (Title 
XIII – Public health) included the full expression ‘harmonisation of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States’; the wording of Art 133 (Title IX - Common commercial policy), in 
French, mentioning ‘harmonisation des dispositions’ makes a lexical variation without any 
substantial legal significance, while its wording in English is exactly the same as in other 
articles.
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harmonisation of national legal provisions. However, most of the provi-
sions of these articles (eight of ten) mentioned harmonisation only in or-
der to prohibit it, using mostly the same wording ‘the Council shall/may 
adopt measures/incentive measures (...) excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States’,7 while only two articles 
treated some procedural matters, enabling the harmonisation of national 
legislations. On the other hand, the notion of ‘approximation’ was present 
in four articles of the TEC,8 always in a context that allows ‘the estab-
lishment and functioning of the internal market.’ It should also be em-
phasised that Article 3 TEC mentioned ‘the approximation of laws of the 
Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the internal 
market’ as one of the activities of the Community in order to achieve its 
mission as defined by Article 2. In turn, the TEC has devoted an entire 
chapter to law approximation, of which the quasi-totality of provisions 
concerned procedural matters and were included in the part of the Treaty 
which defines the policies of the Community. Consequently, the study 
of primary sources cannot give a definitive response to the operational 
distinction between the notions of ‘approximation’ and ‘harmonisation’; 
therefore, only a holistic and purposive analysis of the Union’s legal order 
can provide the answer to this question.9 
The process of European integration is determined by its functional 
and dynamic character; therefore, the Community’s/Union’s10 legal sys-
tem, missions and institutions have evolved in line with their crucial 
objectives of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘approximation’. Given that ‘the con-
cept of approximation is not defined and that various terms are used in 
the TEC (...) it is permissible to ask how the concepts of “coordination”, 
“harmonisation”, “unification” and “coexistence” (...) can be defined and 
is there any hierarchy between them?’11 Although there was no reference 
to ‘unification’ in the TEC, its definition poses no theoretical or practical 
7 This was the case of Arts 13, 137, 149, 150, 151, 152 TEC; Art 129(2) introduces the 
interdiction, while Art 133 included paragraph 6, which provided that ‘an agreement (with 
third countries) cannot be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would 
go beyond the Community’s internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of 
the laws or regulations of the Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such 
harmonisation’.
8 Arts 3, 94, 95 and 136 TEC. Moreover, Art 29 TEU introduces the obligation to ‘ensure 
that their national policies conform to the Union positions’, while Art 34 obliges Member 
States to ‘coordinate their actions’. In both cases, these two articles do not concern the ap-
proximation of legislation, given the fact that they set the framework of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
9 Given the importance of the case law of the Court of Justice for the evolution of the Com-
munity’s/Union’s legal order, such purposive analysis must be based on evolving interpre-
tations given by the Court.
10 See n 2.
11 Doutrelepont and Defalque (n 1) 9.
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problem. It is the same with ‘coordination’: the Treaty repeatedly refers 
to the ‘coordination of Member States’ policies’,12 while only one article 
mentions ‘the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States’.13 Therefore, it is clear that 
this notion has only limited importance for the study of the law approxi-
mation process, since it is more about political than legal coordination. 
On the other hand, the Treaty included several provisions on legal har-
monisation, without providing sufficient indication of a comprehensive 
definition of this concept, as it has ‘no specific content and includes any 
action that tends to associate or combine various elements to bring them 
together (...)’ and approximation appears ‘in the treaty only as a general 
concept’.14 Despite their general character and their position in the TEC, 
the wording of Articles 94 to 97 and the case law15 of the Court showed 
that ‘approximation’ is the single legal term suitable to serve as a basis 
for the study of the Union’s policy whose aim is to eliminate the inconsist-
ent differences in national legislations. In order to clarify and corroborate 
this doctrinal approach and terminological choice, the paper will first fo-
cus on the provisions of primary law dedicated to law approximation (sec-
tion 2), and then examine how they are interpreted and completed by the 
Court of Justice (section 3). Given that Articles 114 and 115 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) have not brought any changes in the 
complex relation between the notions of harmonisation and approxima-
tion, the position the author endeavours to defend remains of the same 
legal relevance after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Many examples 
could be given in support of this observation, but the following seems to 
be the most conclusive: Article 114(1) TFEU refers to the ‘measures for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action in Member States’, while paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 
of the same Article mention ‘harmonisation measure(s)’, exactly as was 
the case in Article 95 TEC.16 
12 For example, Arts 4, 99, 114, 117, 130 and 202 TEC.
13 Art 47 TEC.
14 Doutrelepont and Defalque (n 1) 11. 
15 See n 67. However, given its transversal character, the term ‘harmonisation’ remains 
important for an analysis of the harmonisation of national legislations as a phase (and pre-
condition) for the process of unification.
16 Moreover, as was the case in the TEC, numerous provisions of the TFEU not belonging 
to Title VII Chapter 3 (Approximation of Laws) refer to the ‘harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States’ (Arts 19(2), 79(4), 84, 149, 153(2), 165(4), 166(4), 167(5) 
etc) or the ‘harmonisation measures’ (Art 83(2), 191(2)).
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2 The nature of the provisions on law approximation set by primary 
law
Taken together, the provisions of the TEC aimed to provide the Com-
munity with the necessary competences and procedures to carry out its 
mission, as defined by Article 2.17 Given that ‘the activities of the Com-
munity shall include (…) the approximation of the laws of Member States 
to the extent required for the functioning of the common market’,18 the 
elimination of divergent national legislations can be seen as a genuine 
policy. The content analysis of the TEC supports this assertion: even 
a brief overview19 of its structure is sufficient to conclude that the ap-
proximation of laws enjoyed the status of a common policy. Chapter 3 of 
the sixth title (Articles 94-97) was entirely dedicated to the approxima-
tion of national legal systems, but most of its provisions were procedural 
in nature. Therefore, the rules governing procedural matters of the law 
approximation policy were generally grouped in one chapter of the Trea-
ty, while the rules empowering the Community to adopt measures that 
would lead to such approximation could be found in various provisions 
dedicated to the various Community policies.20 In other words, there has 
always been a provision clearly defining the competence to perform the 
approximation of the Member States’ legislations in certain fields. 
Pursuant to Article 5 TEC, ‘the Community shall act within the lim-
its of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein’.  However, since the CJEC/CJEU insists on its role 
as the ‘final institutional arbiter in matters of conflicts of competence in 
the legal order of the Community’,21 in its Opinion 2/94 the Court made 
some important clarifications: 
17 ‘The Community shall have as its task (…) to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States’, Art 2 TEC.
18 Art 3 TEC.
19 The TEC included 314 articles, of which more than half (159) were dedicated to the poli-
cies of the Community. Similarly, the third part of the Treaty included the largest number 
of titles (21) with provisions defining the competences and activities of the Community. The 
provisions on the approximation of laws (Arts 94 to 97) were in Chapter 3 of the sixth title 
(Common rules on competition, taxation and approximation of laws).
20 This leads to the conclusion that the law approximation policy is a cross-community 
policy that can contribute to the realisation of many other EU policies relevant for the inter-
nal market.
21 Kosmas Boskovits, Le juge communautaire et l’articulation des compétences de la Com-
munauté européenne et des États membres (UDS 1998) 573.
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[I]t follows from Article 3b (now Art. 5 TEU) (…) that it has 
only those powers which have been conferred upon it (…) The 
Community acts ordinarily on the basis of specific powers 
which are not necessarily the express consequence of specific 
provisions of the Treaty but may also be implied from them.22 
As Valérie Michel pertinently remarked, ‘although this judicial rec-
ognition of the principle of conferred powers does not change the legal 
regime of Community competence, it undoubtedly reflects a new policy of 
the Court’.23 Therefore, given that law approximation is clearly a cross-
community policy, the substantive provisions conferring competence may 
be added, deleted or modified, as part of another policy that contributes 
to the ‘functioning of the common market’, without requiring changes in 
the procedural rules of the law approximation policy itself. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the substantive rules conferring competence for 
law approximation (subsection 2.1) before turning to the question of the 
process of the adoption of approximation measures (subsection 2.2). 
2.1 Substantive rules conferring competence for law approximation
Given the cross-cutting nature of the law approximation policy, the 
provisions conferring competence could be found in Articles 94 and 95 
(general provisions), but also in several other provisions of the TEC, dedi-
cated to other Community policies (special provisions). In other words:
the competences necessary for the achievement of the ob-
jectives of common policies can be conferred by the Treaty 
either by general or by specific provision, which may include 
directly or indirectly the use of law approximation measures, 
when objectives defined by these policies make it necessary.24 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has not made any significant 
changes regarding the substantive provisions conferring competence for 
law approximation: Articles 94-97 TEC became Articles 114-117 TFEU 
while, even though it is not relevant to our topic, the European Parliament 
became co-legislator with the Council and ‘the procedure referred to in 
Article 251’ became ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’. Finally, the new 
Article 118 TFEU does not confer competence for law approximation stricto 
sensu, but concerns measures ‘to provide uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised 
Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements’.
22 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759, paras 23-25.
23 Valérie Michel, Recherches sur les compétences de la Communauté européenne 
(L’Harmattan 2003) 20-21.
24 ibid 32.
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According to Article 94 TEC, ‘the Council (...) issues directives for 
the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of 
the common market’. However, after introducing a special and functional 
derogation from Article 94, limited to the ‘achievement of the objectives 
set out in Article 14’, Article 95 TEC provided that ‘the Council shall (...) 
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have 
as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal mar-
ket’. The wording ‘for the achievement of the objectives set out in Arti-
cle 14’25 clearly indicates that the scope of Article 95 was limited to the 
achievement of the objectives predefined in Article 14 TEC (now Article 26 
TFEU), while Article 94 TEC was applicable whenever it was necessary to 
perform ‘the approximation of such laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market’.26 The whole subtlety of this legisla-
tive solution is that Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 TFEU) can be used by 
the EU as the legal ground for the adoption of approximation measures 
aiming to establish or ensure the functioning of the internal market (goal-
driven approximation27), while Article 94 TEC (now Article 115 TFEU) can 
be invoked to eliminate the disparities of national provisions in Member 
States that affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market 
(preventive approximation28). This is one of the reasons why the Lisbon 
Treaty inverted their order, so that Article 94 TEC is now Article 115 
TFEU and Article 95 TEC became Article 114 TFEU, while Article 115 is 
applicable ‘without prejudice to Article 114’. In other words, the need to 
establish or make operational ‘an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’29 
for the EU legislature comes logically before the requirement to prevent 
national legislative discrepancies that might affect the establishment or 
25 ibid.
26 Art 94 TEC.
27 To the author’s best knowledge, so far the notion of ’goal-driven approximation’ has not 
been used in legal literature in order to designate the approximation measures aiming to 
establish or ensure the functioning of the internal market. 
28 The notion of ’preventive approximation’ was, for example, mentioned in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott delivered on 22 September 2005, but without a direct reference to 
Art 94 and only in order to underline that this approximation ‘requires the creation of new 
provisions for which there is as yet no equivalent in the Member States’ (Case C-217/04 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union [2006] ECR I-3771, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 24). On the other hand, 
some authors define ‘preventive harmonisation’ as ‘the creation of a concept that has not 
existed in any of the Member States before (…) as it suppresses differences between the 
legal orders before they even spring up’, Mads Andenas and Camilla Baasch Andersen, 
Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 295. 
29 Art 14(2) TEC and 26(2) TFEU.
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functioning of this area. Moreover, goal-driven approximation requires an 
ordinary legislative procedure, while preventive approximation measures 
are adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure.
The special provisions conferring competences to the Community/
Union in the field of law approximation explicitly or implicitly empower its 
institutions to adopt measures in order to reduce disparities of national 
legislations. In several articles of the TEC devoted to competition,30 tax31 
or consumer protection,32 such authorisation was explicit, while some 
provisions33 of the Treaty dedicated to other common policies included 
implicit authorisations. Finally, the provision of Article 352 TFEU (ex 
Article 308 TEC) known as the ‘residual clause’34 can be added to all 
the previous specific provisions. Its mission is to fill gaps in the Trea-
ty ‘if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of 
the Community’.35 This normative structure may seem to be achieved in 
terms of the attribution of competence to adopt law approximation meas-
ures, but the analysis remains incomplete without an examination of the 
procedural rules for their adoption. 
2.2 Procedural rules for the adoption of law approximation 
measures
Each substantive provision of the TEC granting competence to the 
Community in the field of law approximation was accompanied by a pro-
vision specifying procedural rules for the adoption of the act to serve as 
a legal basis for this approximation. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
has not made any significant changes regarding those procedural rules. 
Therefore, each of the two general provisions conferring competence re-
quires a special procedure (the procedures of Articles 94 and 95 TEC, 
now Articles 115 and 114 TFEU), while special provisions conferring 
competence refer to the procedure under one of the two articles men-
tioned above. To these two specific procedures must be added, firstly, the 
particular procedure in the event of a disparity ‘between the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States’36 
that is ‘distorting the conditions of competition in the common market 
30 Art 96 TEC (belonging to the chapter on the approximation of laws) explicitly conferred 
competence to the Community, while the provision of Art 83 (chapter dedicated to the rules 
on competition) performed it implicitly. 
31 Art 93 TEC.
32 Art 153 TEC.
33 Arts 71, 133, 136 and 175 TEC.
34 Michel (n 23) 32.
35 Art 308 TEC.
36 Art 96 TEC, now Art 116 TFEU.
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and that the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated’37 and, secondly, 
the residual clause procedure (Article 308 TEC, now Article 352 TFEU). 
The procedure of Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 TEC), intended for 
what we named preventive approximation, can only lead to the adoption 
of a Directive whose objective is to perform the approximation of national 
‘laws, regulations or administrative actions’, while the procedure of Arti-
cle 95 (114) leads to the adoption of ‘measures for’ such approximation 
(goal-driven approximation). Moreover, given the different scopes of the 
two articles, it is clear that the dissimilarity in procedural provisions is 
the result of their differences ratione materiae. Article 94 provided that 
the Council shall act unanimously ‘on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and So-
cial Committee’. On the other hand, Article 95 specified that the Council 
‘after consulting the Economic and Social Committee’38 should act in ac-
cordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 TEC (co-decision 
procedure), which required, in principle, only a qualified majority39 in the 
Council and fully involved the European Parliament in all stages of the 
decision-making process. In addition, two other procedural specificities 
of Article 114 TFEU deserve mentioning: firstly, the reference to scientific 
developments and, secondly, the right of the Member States to maintain 
or introduce, under specific conditions, certain justified national provi-
sions partially not in compliance with an approximation measure. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 114 TFEU urges all institutions involved in 
the decision-making process to take into account scientific developments 
in the fields of ‘health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection’. In the same vein, if a Member State, in the presence of an ap-
proximation measure already adopted, ‘deems it necessary’ to maintain 
justified national provisions,40 it could notify the Commission of these 
37 ibid.
38 Moreover, the two procedures were also different with regard to the necessary prior 
consultation phase, since Art 95 (referring to the procedure of Art 251) fully included the 
European Parliament in the decision-making process (co-decision of the Council and the 
Parliament), while Art 94 included a simple consultation of the Parliament. When both legal 
grounds were applicable for the adoption of a Community act, an important judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867) privileged the 
procedure more favourable for the respect of the democratic process, that is to say, the one 
with the stronger involvement of the European Parliament.
39 Under Art 251 TEC, the only situation when the Council must act unanimously was 
provided by paragraph 3: ‘the Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which 
the Commission has delivered a negative opinion of the Commission’.
40 Art 95(4) specified that maintaining national provisions may be justified either ‘on 
grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30’ (reasons of public morality, public policy 
or public security, protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property) or ‘relating to the protection of the environment or the 
working environment’. However, paragraph 5 indicated that the national provisions intro-
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provisions and the grounds for their maintenance.41 Within six months 
of such a notification, the Commission may approve or reject the na-
tional provisions, ‘after having verified whether or not they are a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an obstacle to 
the functioning of the internal market’.42 In the absence of a decision of 
the Commission within this period, the national provisions that are not 
in accordance with harmonisation measures could be considered as au-
thorised. It is particularly important to underline that both the Commis-
sion and the Member States may appeal directly to the Court of Justice, 
without issuing a reasoned opinion (the obligation of the Commission, if 
it initiates the infringement proceedings pursuant to Article 258 TFEU) or 
bringing the matter previously before the Commission (the obligation of 
any Member State who initiates an infringement action against another 
Member State pursuant to Article 259 TFEU).
The specific procedure of Article 116 TFEU (ex Article 96 TEC) con-
cerns exclusively competition in the internal market, if the Commission 
‘finds that a difference between the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States is distorting the conditions of 
competition (...) and that the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated’. 
In such a case, the Commission is obliged to consult the Member States 
in which the distortion may produce effects. This consultation may lead 
to an agreement that eliminates such distortion; otherwise, the European 
Parliament and the Council are entitled, ‘acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure’,43 to issue the necessary directives. There-
fore, this situation can be seen as a residual law approximation, which 
may only occur in the absence of an agreement eliminating the distortion 
without the intervention of an EU regulatory measure. In this case, the 
European legislation encourages negotiation between the stakeholders, 
enabling creative solutions that respect the general legal framework. Fi-
nally, if the residual clause of Article 352 TFEU is the legal basis for the 
adoption of an approximation measure, the procedure is similar to the 
one intended for preventive approximation. Consequently, the analysis of 
this complex set of provisions leads to the conclusion that the procedural 
rules for the adoption of law approximation measures can be seen as a 
function of substantive rules. In other words, procedures differ exten-
duced after the Community harmonisation measure must be ‘based on new scientific evi-
dence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds 
of a problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation 
measure’.
41 Art 95(8) TEC introduced an additional rule, ratione materiae, limited to public health 
issues.
42 Art 95(6) subparagraph 1 TEC.
43 Art 116(2) TFEU.
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sively, depending on the intention of the European legislation to either 
establish or ensure the functioning of the internal market (goal-driven 
approximation) or to eliminate the disparities of national provisions in 
Member States that affect the establishment or functioning of the inter-
nal market (preventive approximation).
3 Jurisprudential implementation of primary law on law approxima-
tion by the Court of Justice
In accordance with the overall political and legal originality of the 
EC/EU and its institutions, its highest judicial body has many unique 
features compared to international courts44 and national supreme courts. 
The principles of enforceability of its judgments45 and mandatory referral 
in matters of interpretation and application46 make the Court of Justice 
unique in comparison to international justice. Moreover, the Court has 
played an essential role in the creation and development of the Commu-
nity’s/Union’s legal system, a role that is widely different from the role 
of the national courts in the Member States’ legal systems. With a mis-
sion to carry out ‘the tasks entrusted to the Community’,47 ensuring that 
‘in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed’48 
and through its prerogative ‘to give preliminary rulings concerning the 
interpretation of the Treaty’,49 the Court has had a complementary nor-
mative function. In other words, the judicial interpretation of primary 
law completes the provisions of the Treaty, which are often ambiguous 
because of their general formulation. It is the same with regard to the 
cross-community policy of law approximation. 
The provisions of the founding treaties conferring competence to 
the Community in the field of law approximation have been constantly 
changing, and to be properly applied they often required judicial inter-
pretation. On the other hand, ‘full harmonisation is difficult to achieve 
(...) and management of the harmonised and the non-harmonised area 
44 Of course, the place of the CJEC in the Community’s legal order was a direct result of the 
numerous differences between the European Community/Union and federal states, on the 
one hand, and classical international organisations, on the other. Moreover, the Court of 
Justice, through its jurisprudential activity, deeply influenced the determination of its own 
role and prerogatives, given that only the general legal basis can be found in the Treaties, 
Statute of the Court and its Rules of Procedure. 
45 ‘The judgments of the Court of Justice shall be enforceable under the conditions laid 
down in Article 256’, Art 244 TEC (now Art. 280 TFEU).
46 ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein’, 
Art 292 TEC (now Art 344 TFEU).
47 Art 7 TEC.
48 Art 220 TEC.
49 Art 234 TEC (now Art 267 TFEU).
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go together’.50 The mutual recognition principle, introduced by the Court 
of Justice, ‘guarantees free movement of goods and services without the 
need to harmonise Member States’ national legislation’.51 This principle 
can also be applicable in other areas, such as, for example, for the rec-
ognition of professional qualifications,52 judicial decisions53 or protection 
measures.54 Therefore, the study of how primary law on law approxima-
tion has been interpreted and completed by the Court of Justice must 
include, on the one hand, an analysis of judicial interpretation of the 
provisions conferring competence (subsection 3.1) and, on the other, an 
examination of the judicial elaboration of the mutual recognition princi-
ple (subsection 3.2). 
3.1 Judicial interpretation of the provisions conferring competence
A critical analysis of the substantive rules55 conferring competence 
for law approximation reveals that the legal basis for the adoption of Com-
munity acts were Articles 94 and 95 TEC (general provisions), but also 
several other articles dedicated to other Community policies (special pro-
visions). However, given the nature of these provisions, it is often difficult 
to make a clear distinction between their respective fields of application. 
Some rules are complementary ratione materiae, but often require differ-
ent procedural solutions in the context of the divergent distribution of 
powers between the Community and the Member States. In addition, the 
intrinsic dynamism of the institutional structure of the ECs/EU requires 
an evolutionary interpretation, developed ‘concerning its future policy’.56 
In its decisions regarding the questions related to the allocation of powers 
50 Rodolphe Muñoz, Le principe de reconnaissance mutuelle et l’abrogation de la décision 
3052/95 (EP 2007) 6-7. 
51 Official portal of the European Union – Internal Market: General Framework <http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/internal_market_general_framework/
l21001b_en.htm>accessed 8 September 2014.
52 Art 47 TEC (now 53 TFEU) and Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications [2005] 
OJ L255/22.
53 For example, the Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters 
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of 
their enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ L372/27.
54 Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 
2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters [2013] OJ L118/4.
55 Almost all the cases submitted to the CJEC concerned the interpretation of the substan-
tive provisions of the TEC. However, some aspects of the case may indirectly affect the pro-
cedural provisions, but even then the issue is most often the choice between two substan-
tive provisions (as it was, for example, in Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR 
I-2867). Therefore, here we will focus only on the judicial interpretation of the substantive 
provisions of the TEC.
56 Case C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827, para 15.
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and legal basis for Community action,57 the Court of Justice has greatly 
enriched and deepened the existing legislation on law approximation. 
Certain special provisions conferring competence for the adoption 
of approximation measures were inserted into the Treaty after the adop-
tion of Community acts already operating a minimal approximation in 
the same field. As Michel underlined, ‘the coexistence, for matters within 
the scope of the Community, of the grounds for national and Community 
competence is articulated in a variety of modes’58 given that ‘this polymor-
phism of Community competence is a reflection of the principle of vari-
able and measured integration in different fields’.59 In such a context, the 
Court has introduced an important clarification, the objective of which 
was to preserve the acquired level of law approximation. Notwithstanding 
that in the case before the Court it was about a special provision stricto 
sensu, the judgment of 25 April 2002 in the case Commission v France60 
offers a generally applicable solution: 
Article 153 EC cannot be relied on in order to justify inter-
preting the directive as seeking a minimum harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States which could not preclude 
one of them from retaining or adopting protective measures 
stricter than the Community measures,61 
because this provision of the Treaty 
is worded in the form of an instruction addressed to the Com-
munity concerning its future policy and cannot permit the 
Member States, owing to the direct risk that would pose for 
the acquis communautaire, autonomously to adopt measures 
contrary to the Community law contained in the directives 
already adopted at the time of entry into force of that law.62 
Therefore, the Member States are not allowed to jeopardise the level 
of approximation already achieved by the Community legislature ‘pursu-
ant to Article 95 EC in the context of attainment of the internal market 
with which in that respect the measures adopted under Article 94 EC 
57 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079; Case C-380/03 
Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-11573; 
Joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural 
Health and Others v Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales [2005] 
ECR I-6451.
58 Michel (n 23) 20-21.
59 ibid.
60 Case C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827.
61 ibid, para 15.
62 ibid.
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must be equated’,63 even relying on a special provision64 that allows them 
to retain or adopt certain stricter protective measures. 
Given the concise formulations of Articles 94 and 95 TEC (Articles 
115 and 114 TFEU) and the transversal nature of their objectives (es-
tablishment and functioning of the internal market), it is first necessary 
to specify the conditions for their invocation. Secondly, those conditions 
have to be accompanied by some clarification of the relationship between 
general provisions and special provisions conferring competence for the 
approximation of laws. As regards the first question, the precisions given 
by the Court were relative to the degree and the possible consequences 
of the differences in national legislations. As the Court underlined in its 
judgment of 12 December 2006 in the case Germany v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union:
[W]hile a mere finding of disparities between national rules 
is not sufficient to justify having recourse to Article 95 EC, 
it is otherwise where there are differences between the laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States 
which are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and 
thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal 
market.65 
However, the nature of the above-mentioned national provisions is 
not sufficient; they must also have an impact on intra-Community trade 
with a considerable degree of predictability: 
[I]t is also settled case-law that, although recourse to Article 
95 EC as a legal basis is possible if the aim is to prevent the 
emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multi-
farious development of national laws, the emergence of such 
obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be 
designed to prevent them.66 
Given the general and horizontal character of Article 95, the Court 
clarified the nature of the Community legislature’s intervention when the 
adopted act is based on this provision of the Treaty: 
[B]y the expression ‘measures for the approximation’ in Art 
95 EC the authors of the Treaty intended to confer on the 
Community legislature a discretion, depending on the general 
63 ibid.
64 This was the case of Art 153(4).
65 Case C-380/03 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
[2006] ECR I-11573, para 37.
66 ibid, para 38.
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context and the specific circumstances of the matter to be 
harmonized, as regards the harmonisation technique most 
appropriate for achieving the desired result.67 
Moreover, 
[A]n act adopted by the Community legislature on the basis 
of Art 95 EC, in accordance with the co-decision procedure 
referred to in Art 251 EC, may be limited to defining the pro-
visions which are essential for the achievement of objectives 
in connection with the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market in the field concerned, while conferring pow-
er on the Commission to adopt the harmonisation measures 
needed for the implementation of the legislative act in ques-
tion.68 
On the other hand, the jurisprudence related to Article 94 TEC (now 
Article 115 TFEU) is much less abundant and does not bring enough ele-
ments to define what the Court designates as ‘settled case-law’. In one of 
its recent judgments (February 2015), the CJEU limits its observations to 
the fact that the harmonisation of national legislations pursuant to Arti-
cle 115 TFEU is ‘gradual’,69 without any additional specification.
The complex relationship between the provisions of the TEC confer-
ring competence and the ability (for certain common policies) of their 
cumulative application also required a judicial interpretation.70 In other 
words, 
the existence of competing legal grounds and the selection 
of the appropriate legal basis by the institutions gave rise to 
substantial litigation resulting in particular in the introduc-
tion of a new Art 95 on the approximation of the laws increas-
ing the competencies of the Community.71 
When the competence in the field of law approximation is based on 
two (both general and special) provisions of primary law, the preliminary 
stage should consist of the selection of the appropriate legal basis, the de-
cision having numerous political, procedural and technical implications. 
67 Case C-66/04 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
[2005] ECR I-10553, para 45.
68 ibid, para 50.
69 Joined cases C-144/13, C-154/13 and C-160/13 VDP Dental Laboratory NV v Staatssec-
retaris van Financiën, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X BV and Nobel Biocare Nederland 
BV (CJEU, 26 February 2015) para 60.
70 Case law on this subject is abundant. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis will 
be limited to the settled case law and major judgments.
71 Michel (n 23) 38.
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In order to solve this problem, the case law introduced a general criterion: 
in the context of the organization of the powers of the Com-
munity the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be 
based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial re-
view. Those factors include in particular the aim and content 
of the measure.72 
Consequently, to justify the recourse to a specific article of the Trea-
ty, the European legislature must take into account the overall context 
of the future act and interpret its contents in a systematic and purposive 
manner. 
3.2 Judicial elaboration of the principle of mutual recognition
The reasoning of the Court in its famous judgment in the case Cas-
sis de Dijon73 led to the introduction of a new rule, known as the principle 
of mutual recognition. This principle was widely deepened and comple-
mented by subsequent case law and secondary legislation, such as, for 
example, Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 9 July 2008.74 Moreover, ‘the principle of mutual rec-
ognition may have some utility in case of law approximation, especially 
when the harmonisation seems insufficient or in order to highlight cer-
tain links between various acts (for example in pharmaceuticals)’.75
Generally, the principle of mutual recognition is only applicable in 
the absence of common rules harmonising national legislations.76 In oth-
er words, ‘mutual recognition applies to products which are not subject 
to Community harmonisation legislation, or to aspects of products falling 
outside the scope of such legislation’.77 In addition, 
72 Case C-271/94 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I-1689, 
para 14. 
73 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649.
74 The Regulation laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national 
technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Deci-
sion No 3052/95/EC [2008] OJ L218/21.
75 Michel (n 23) 12.
76 ‘In the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing of alcohol (...) 
it is for the Member States to regulate all matters relating to the production and marketing 
of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own territory’, judgment in the case Cassis de 
Dijon, para 8. 
77 The Regulation laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national 
technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Deci-
sion No 3052/95/EC, recital 3.
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according to that principle, a Member State may not prohibit 
the sale on its territory of products which are lawfully mar-
keted in another Member State, even where those products 
were manufactured in accordance with technical rules differ-
ent from those to which domestic products are subject,78 
the only exception being ‘restrictions which are justified on the 
grounds set out in Article 30 of the Treaty, or on the basis of other over-
riding reasons of public interest and which are proportionate to the aim 
pursued’.79
The importance of the principle of mutual recognition is that it makes 
the concept of free movement operational in the absence (total or partial) 
of a measure for the approximation of legislation. Furthermore, the im-
pact of this principle is such that the Court has also found its application 
appropriate, mutatis mutandis, in the field of freedom to provide services:
Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty do not preclude a Member 
State from imposing national rules (…) on a business estab-
lished in another Member State which provides services in 
the first Member State by posting workers for that purpose, 
on the two-fold condition that: (i) the workers do not enjoy 
an essentially similar level of protection under the law of the 
Member State where their employer is established, so that 
the application of the national rules of the first Member State 
confers a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which 
significantly adds to their social protection, and (ii) the appli-
cation of those rules by the first Member State is proportion-
ate to the public interest objective pursued.80 
Therefore, in the case of equivalence of national legislations (the pro-
tection provided is ‘essentially similar’), any economic operator estab-
lished in a Member State providing services in another Member State 
shall not be subject, in the second State, to stricter national regulations. 
Even though the Court did not expressly mention the principle of mutual 
recognition, it is clear that in the above judgment all its crucial elements 
can be found (lawfulness of product/service, obligation of the State of 
destination to permit the marketing of the product/delivery of service, 
the possibility to invoke overriding public interest). Consequently, this 
jurisprudence introduces an extended application of the principle of mu-
tual recognition to the freedom to provide services. 
78 ibid.
79 ibid.
80 Joined cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte 
[2001] ECR I-7831, para 53. 
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4. Conclusion 
The inherent dynamism of the legal and political structure of the 
EC/EU has often had as a consequence the constant evolution of its 
terminology. Numerous common policies as well as the legal concepts ac-
companying them have not remained immune to the changing objectives 
assigned to the Community/Union. It is often almost impossible to define 
the concepts used by EC/EU legislation in a static, sufficiently precise 
and unconditional manner. The system of substantive and procedural 
rules governing the approximation of national legislations in all areas of 
EC/EU competence has its legal basis in the provisions of primary law. 
The analysis of those provisions has indicated that their purpose is either 
to establish or ensure the functioning of the internal market (goal-driven 
approximation) or to eliminate the disparities of national provisions in 
Member States that affect the establishment or functioning of the inter-
nal market (preventive approximation). These provisions, however, rep-
resent only a general and vague framework of the approximation policy. 
It has only been through the abundant interpretative jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice regarding the questions related to the allocation of 
powers and the legal basis for common action that this framework has 
become relatively solidly established. Therefore, ‘approximation’ can be 
considered as a unique legal term suitable to serve as a basis for the 
study of the Union’s policy whose aim is to eliminate the inconsistent 
differences in national legislations, while variable and measured supra-
national integration in different fields of the Union’s competence will con-
tinue to require adaptive jurisprudential interpretation. 
